CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND THE VIRTUES
AND VICES OF PROFESSOR WESTEN'S
LINGUISTICS
TIMOTHY P. TERRELL*
Traditionally, or perhaps merely habitually, legal issues have been
organized around major themes or concepts, such as "negligence," "contract," "liberty," and so on. The study of these various legal compartments-their present detail, their origins and development, and their
normative foundations-I have as a matter of convenience labeled "conceptual analysis."' Conceptual analysis is not, however, in the mainstream of contemporary legal scholarship. Despite remarkable diversity
in both content and style, one recurring theme in current academic work
is the notion that language and linguistic categories have little application to the resolution of legal controversies. According to conventional
wisdom, words in and of themselves are too flexible and superficial to
affect directly the deeper "policy" concerns that are truly at stake. 2 Con-

ceptual analysis, in contrast, takes legal language seriously, examining
the complex relationships among words, reasoning, rhetoric, and ulti-

mately, policy. In essence, it is concerned more with identifying the
structure of legal questions than with finding discrete legal answers. It
*
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1. For my own exercises within this category, see infra notes 8, 11. For a general discussion of
"conceptual studies and exercises," see Summers, Legal Philosophy Today-An Introduction, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY I (R. Summers ed. 1968).
2. Nearly all modem analyses of words and phrases in the Constitution are examples of this
approach. For a useful summary of some of the competing contemporary themes in this area, see
Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective: A Response to Professor Van Alstyne, 78 Nw. U,L,
REV. 1435 (1984).
Of course, language may be "superficial" in the sense that it does not necessarily control the
outcome of a controversy. Nevertheless, language may play a number of different roles that will
make it "important." Thus, language may be characterized as indefinite, but it is not generally
regarded as irrelevant. Indeed, language may be an active contributor (or obstacle) in social
processes. Scholars within the Critical Legal Studies movement have been the most consistent in
noting the substantive harm that traditional linguistic categories and forms can impose. Language,
they argue, reflects and guides contemporary patterns of moral thought and, thus, in the context of
law it may assist in perpetuating illegitimate forms of domination and alienation. Language ceases to
be a neutral medium of communicative exchange. For an extensive discussion of this and related
points, see Heller, Structuralismand Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 133-55 (1984). Other recent
sources

include J.

WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECON-

STITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY

Meaning, 96 ETHICS 620 (1984).

(1984); Ball, When Words Lose Their
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suggests, however, that legal answers will never be adequate until the
questions are better understood.
Professor Peter Westen has over the past few years paid much attention to the structure of legal questions, specifically questions involving
the concept of "equality."' 3 However, in his most recent article, "Freedom" and "Coercion"--Virtue Words and Vice Words, 4 Professor Wes-

ten broadened his analysis considerably to examine more general issues
of legal and moral linguistics.5 Although Professor Westen and I share
several important conclusions about the nature and importance of language in legal contexts, I am compelled to take exception to certain
points in Virtue Words and Vice Words. The purpose of this article is to

identify those points, and through them to discuss fundamental issues
concerning the nature of legal and moral discourse.

I must emphasize that despite my criticisms of his linguistic analysis, the points on which I agree with Professor Westen are more significant than those on which I disagree. We are in accord, for example, on

the most basic issue of all: the importance and usefulness of conceptual
analysis. Many legal scholars would deny even this point, suggesting
that the indeterminacy of legal rules is in part due to the indeterminacy

of language.6 Although this insight is not new, 7 recent scholarship has
gone further and virtually dismissed the prospect of learning anything of
3. See Westen, The Concept of Equal Opportunity, 95 ETHICS 837 (1985); Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REv. 604 (1983) [hereinafter Westen, Meaning of Equality]; Westen, To Lure the TarantulaFrom Its Hole: A Response, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1982); Westen, On "Confusing Ideas" A Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982);
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) [hereinafter Westen, Equality].
Most of these writings were prompted by criticism of his thesis by other scholars. See Chemerinksy,
In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); D'Amato, Is
EqualityA Totally Empty Idea? 81 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1983); Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea
of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245
(1983).
4. Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"-VirtueWords and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541.
5. I use the term "linguistics" rather loosely here and throughout the article to refer generally
to the range of subjects sometimes categorized under headings such as philology, morphology, linguistic philosophy, and philosophy of language. For a summary discussion of the distinction between linguistic philosophy and the philosophy of language, see B. MAGEE, MEN OF IDEAS 182-200
(1978). Much has been written on the philosophy of language. Some of the more basic or wellknown works are: N. CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE (1975); D. COOPER, PHILOSOPHY
AND THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE (1973); T. HACKING, WHY DOES LANGUAGE MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY? (1975); R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952); W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT
(1960); J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969); THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (J. Searle ed. 1971); L.
WIT-rGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1971).

6. See Boyle, The Politicsof Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 685, 708-21 (1985).
7. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961).
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value by studying the background nature of basic legal concepts. 8
This attitude, however, misses a crucial point. While vagueness and
flexibility are certainly inherent features of language, "indeterminacy"

has been confused with the related but quite distinct idea of "unstructured." Even though relevant textual authority may not dictate a particular resolution to a complex legal problem, the problem itself will
nevertheless have an identifiable structure.

Conceptual analysis is

anchored in the belief that this structure results in part from the language
used to express the problem, and that this language is subject to a corresponding internal organization. 9 Although particular words may not

have single, completely uncontroversial meanings, linguistic variability
will follow certain patterns that can be discovered through conceptual
legal analysis. The primary function of this analysis is to make legal debate more focused and deliberate, and perhaps more honest.

Professor Westen's work, 10 like my own," has consistently sought
to convey this message. While I have analyzed concepts such as "property" and "liberty," he has used "equality" as his test case, criticizing the

superficiality of the legal rhetoric that employs the term. He has concluded that the concept of equality, properly examined and understood,
is descriptively "empty," possessing only the varying normative content

that particular individuals choose to give it.12 Although I disagree in
part with this conclusion' 3 (and indeed Professor Westen seems to have
modified his views on this point'4), I am nevertheless in complete agreement with the importance he attaches to the linguistic analytic exercise.

Thus, my criticisms of Professor Westen's approach, as fundamental as I
believe them to be, are more like a squabble between kinfolk than a battle

between warring tribes.
8. This has been the consistent picture presented by courts and commentators with regard to
the basic concepts of "property," "liberty," and "due process" that I have examined specifically. See
Terrell & Smith, Publicity,Liberty, and IntellectualProperty: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis
of the InheritabilityIssue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1 (1985); Terrell, Liberty: The Concept and Its ConstilutionalContext, I NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.POL'Y 545 (1985) [hereinafter Terrell, Liberty];
Terrell, "'Property,
" "DueProcess," and the DistinctionBetween Definition and Theory in LegalAnalysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861 (1982) [hereinafter Terrell, "Property," 'Due Process'].
9. This organization or structure involves not only the (relatively) independent functions performed by descriptive and normative mental activities that are the basic subject of this comment, but
also the nature of the definitional exercise by itself. See infra note 20.
10. See supra note 3.
11. In addition to the articles listed in note 8, supra, see Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the
Dimensions ofLegal Reasoning and the Development of FundamentalNormative Principles,72 CAL.
L. REv. 288 (1984).
12. Westen, Equality, supra note 3, at 547-48.
13. See Terrell, Liberty, supra note 8,at 548 n.10.
14. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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Even that squabble is a narrow one, for we also agree on certain
important techniques within conceptual analysis. We have both argued
that two rather distinct elements-one based in objective 15 data, the

other in subjective normative assessment-generate the meaning or substance of a term. He has labeled these elements description and prescription;16 1 have referred to them as definition and theory. 17 Although I will
later note some fundamental differences between our understandings of
these elements,"' we share the basic "fact-value" dichotomy that serves
as the foundation of this approach. Moreover, in Virtue Words and Vice
Words, Professor Westen has for the first time used the descriptive tech-

nique of identifying the "core" constitutive elements of the concept
under investigation,'

9

a technique that has played a particularly impor-

tant role in my previous work.20 In spite of this agreement between us,
15. "Objective" is of course a very dangerous word. Much philosophic effort has been spent
disproving that any approach can be truly objective. See generally THE POLrrIcs OF INTERPRETATION (W. Mitchell ed. 1983). For present purposes I will bypass most of that debate and assume
that enough of a distinction exists between objectivity and subjectivity to make the term "objective"
meaningful. In other words, I shall assume that individual perceptions of events or objects have
enough in common, and are not so tainted with preexisting bias or distortion, that "facts" can be
denominated and used as one basis for communication. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying
text.
16. See Westen, supra note 4, at 589-91; Westen, Meaning ofEquality, supra note 3, at 607.
17. See, eg., Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," supra note 8, at 862.
18. See infra Part IIA.
19. See Westen, supra note 4, at 549, 559-69.
20. See Terrell, Liberty, supra note 8, at 554; Terrell, supra note 11, at 311-16; Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," supra note 8, at 865-74.
Differences between my approach to language and that of Westen exist here as well, though I
am not certain of the degree to which we differ. In a footnote, Westen apparently attempts to forestall those who would criticize him for linguistic formalism in his use of core elements to establish
the meaning of concepts. He explains:
I do not mean to say that all statements of "freedom" must have a common meaning
merely because they all use the same word. I recognize the fallacy of assuming that all uses
of a given term are necessarily predicated on the presence of "common qualities" among
the things to which they refer.... Rather, I believe that all statements of "freedom" have
a core meaning, not because they must, but because ordinary usage shows that they do.
Westen, supra note 4, at 549 n.3 1. I believe Westen is partially correct on this point, but the difference between our depictions of the role of the core meaning of a term is significant. In my opinion,
Westen seems to conflate the separate ideas of "core" meaning and "common" or shared meaning.
Although I would agree that "common" meaning is not a necessary characteristic for the use of a
term with open texture, a "core" meaning is a necessary predicate for the labeling of a conceptual
entity.
I have in the past referred to core meaning as "focal" meaning, a term borrowed from John
Finnis. See J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs 6, 9-11 (1981). Perhaps the difference in labeling helps to explain the subtle distinction between this central conception of an entity
and the more general idea of common elements constituting that entity. The term "focal" captures
the function of this exercise in the context of set theory. The use of any label denotes an attempt to
differentiate something from something else. This differentiation suggests that the use of the label
may be appropriate or inappropriate in particular instances. The occasions on which the term is
appropriately used can be grouped into a set. The purpose of any definition is to identify the ele-

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1986:660

however, this article will demonstrate that very different linguistic conclusions can be generated from rather similar starting points.

Those portions of Professor Westen's article that are directly relevant to the general topic of conceptual analysis can be summarized in
three interrelated stages. He argues, first, that a "virtue-vice" category of
words exists; second, that this category can be identified by reference to
two key linguistic characteristics; and third, that this category is worthy
of study because the terms within it have "great rhetorical force." As to
ments according to which such a set is established. The traditional problem with definitional exercises, however, has been that the boundary or perimeter of these sets-the "line" of their separation
from "inappropriate" uses of the term-is always hazy to some degree, suggesting that the sets
themselves are unstructured collections of largely incommensurable, ad hoc, unfocused uses of the
word. Ludwig Wittgenstein argued, for example, that the most organization one could expect from
the elements constituting a concept was a certain "family" connection or resemblance linking one
example with another, but with no particular characteristics necessarily being common to all of
them. See L. WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 2-41; see also Terrell, "Property," "Due Process,"
supra note 8,at 867 n.21. This is what Professor Westen seems to have in mind when he denies the
necessity for "common qualities."
The theory that terms have "focal" meaning, on the other hand, suggests that the sets representing the use of terms do have a structure and are linked more rigorously than the "family" connection
suggested by Wittgenstein. The sets will not be a jumble of isolated instances, but rather hierarchically organized series. At the "center" will be the archetypical example of the use of the term-a use
that everyone agrees captures all of the term's essential elements. As one or more of these elements
is missing in uses of the label, the example moves away from the "focal" meaning and out toward the
perimeter of the set. At some point, so many of the elements that characterize the term are absent
that the use of the label is perceived as being outside the boundary of the set; the use of the term is no
longer appropriate. To understand where the boundary lies between appropriate and inappropriate
uses of a term, reference must be had to the central or focal case. Thus, various peripheral uses of a
complex term of several constitutive elements may indeed, as Professor Westen suggests, have nothing in common with each other. I would argue, however, that they nonetheless will always have
some element in common with thefocal meaning of the term. For example, a term might be characterized by four elements: A, B, C, and D. The simultaneous presence of all these elements would
constitute the central or focal case. A peripheral use of the term might have elements A and B,
while another has only C and D. Both might be considered legitimate uses of the label in question,
but a sophisticated exercise is required to identify the nature of the relationship between the two uses
of the term.
A "core" meaning for freedom, therefore, does not exist just by coincidence, as Professor Westen's footnote suggests, but because such a meaning is essential for the set to which the label "freedom" is applied. And that "core" or "focus" will exist even though various examples of how the
term is used may have no elements "in common" with each other. The commonality always refers
to the core, not to particular uses of a term on the periphery of legitimacy.
This linguistic exercise is not of critical importance to Westen's analysis of freedom, however,
because he concludes that each use of the term "freedom" is characterized essentially by the presence of all three elements that constitute the core meaning of the term: (1) an agent (2) unconstrained (3) to achieve some goal. Westen, supra note 4, at 551-55, 590. The "freedom" set will then
be structured according to the degree to which each of these elements is specified. As Professor
Westen puts it: "There is an inverse relationship between the degree to which the terms of a concept
are specified and the extent to which it is open-textured or 'protean'...." Id. at 590. Thus, in
contrast to my hypothetical example above, no uses of the term "freedom" will exist under Professor
Westen's analysis that have only some of the characteristics that constitute the core meaning; instead, all uses of the term freedom will have all three of his basic elements in common.
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Professor Westen's first step, the existence of a virtue-vice category is
based on the notion that concepts are the product of some function of
description and prescription. 2 ' In Virtue Words and Vice Words, Professor Westen focuses on those uses of language in which a normative
message is of particular importance---circumstances involving "conceptions of good and evil."' 22 He concludes that this kind of moral discourse
will often involve a distinct linguistic category-one that contains what
23
he calls "virtue words" and "vice words."
Professor Westen then argues that virtue words and vice words possess two characteristic features. First, although these terms retain their
own special identity, they nevertheless can and do vary in actual usage
across a range of particular and even contradictory meanings.2 4 Professor Westen uses the familiar descriptive phrase of "open texture" to summarize this attribute. 25 The second feature of virtue words and vice
words is that they "tend to convey normative judgments without being
defined as expressing normative judgments. ' 26 Thus, virtue words and
vice words are neither entirely descriptive nor entirely normative in
content.
To illustrate the category of virtue words and vice words, Professor
Westen focuses on the terms "freedom" 27 and "coercion. '28 An important element in his development of this category is a contrast he attempts
to establish between these words and two other categories of terms. He
describes the term "federal," for example, as a "descriptive, normatively
neutral" term and "justice" and "duress" as terms that are normative by
29
definition.
Finally, Professor Westen asserts that the terms with which he is
primarily concerned demand special attention because the features of
open texture and nonlexical normativity "combine to give virtue words
and vice words great rhetorical force."'30 As he summarizes this point:
Because they are protean, they are versatile. They are vehicles through
which people can express their most deeply-held moral beliefs, without
the necessity of making those beliefs morally consistent. Moreover,
because virtue words and vice words tend to be normative, they tend to
21. See Westen, supra note 4, at 554 (noting the distinction between "descriptive freedoms and
prescriptive freedoms").
22. Id. at 542.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 543-44.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 544.
27. Id. at 546-47, 549-58.
28. Id. at 547-48, 558-89.
29. Id. at 544-45.
30. Id. at 546.
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persuade. They tend to tilt or point moral discourse in the direction
the speaker wishes it to go, whether the speaker happens to be endorsing a particular position or condemning it. Finally, because they are
nonlexically normative, they tend to persuade without being completely conclusory. They point moral discourse in the direction the
speaker wishes it to go without enabling
his opponent to say that he
31
has simply defined away the issue.
My criticism of Professor Westen's reasoning focuses on the second
of his three analytic stages-the linguistic characteristics that are supposed to set his "virtue-vice" category off from other words. I will challenge his depiction of both "open texture" and "nonlexical norrnativity,"
and the relationship between them. This will in turn raise serious questions about his first and third stages: the virtue-vice category itself, I will
argue, does not exist as he has attempted to develop it, nor do the words
purportedly within it appear to have the rhetorical force he has ascribed
to them.
These points are developed in various ways in all the sections of this
article; criticizing the central step in Professor Westen's linguistic analysis inevitably challenges the others. Thus, the organization of my remarks revolves around different matters. Part I concentrates on
Professor Westen's own version of the virtue-vice category. In the first
section of Part I, I dispute the linguistic uniqueness and importance of
that category; in the second section, I question the adequacy of Professor
Westen's separation within this category of virtue words from vice words.
My misgivings about the linguistic analysis in Virtue Words and Vice
Words then prompt me to investigate at a more fundamental level the
description-prescription dichotomy that generated this troublesome virtue-vice category in the first place. I shall argue in Part II that the generative elements of meaning in legal and moral concepts are more complex
than either Professor Westen or I have previously suggested.
I have chosen not to discuss in this article the many differences between the analytic conclusions Professor Westen and I have reached concerning the particular concepts of freedom and liberty.32 Although those
31. Id.
32. For example, Professor Westen identifies three elements as constituting the core meaning of
"freedom." See supra note 20. By contrast, I have argued that the focal meaning of "liberty" has
nine elements. Terrell, Liberty, supra note 8, at 554. Westen also differentiates freedom from liberty; he considers liberty a subset of freedom. According to Westen, liberty refers "to a relationship
in which a particular class of agents (i.e., purposeful agents) are unhindered by a particular class of
constraints (i.e., human constraints) to pursue their goals." Westen, supra note 4, at 591. Although
I believe there might be possible distinctions between the two terms, see Terrell, Liberty, supra note
8, at 549 n.11, the differences are too narrow and strained to make the distinction between the terms
meaningful. I am not convinced by Westen's limitation of "liberty" to human contexts, and the
corresponding expansion of only freedom to nonhuman contexts such as, to use his example, "The
river is free from pollution." Westen, supra note 4, at 591. I would argue that our use of "free"
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disagreements are interesting and thought-provoking in their own right, I
consider them secondary to the more general linguistic issues raised by
his article.

I.
A.

THE INADEQUACIES OF THE VIRTUE-VICE CATEGORY

The Nature of Virtue and Vice Words.

The primary difficulty I have with Professor Westen's development
of the "virtue-vice" category is his assumption that two fundamental
characteristics distinguish the words within this category from other
words. In fact, these characteristics-open texture and nonlexical
normativity-do not, either singly or in combination, 'generate the result
he seeks. Open texture is a feature of nearly all words, but particularly
those words used in legal and philosophical discourse. Similarly, nonlexical normativity fails to tell us anything useful or meaningful in our effort
to understand these types of terms.
I am not certain whether Professor Westen considers open texture
to be a feature unique to virtue words and vice words, or a feature of all
language that just happens to be particularly important with respect to
these terms. Early in Virtue Words and Vice Words he describes both
open texture and nonlexical normativity as "distinctive" 3 3 characteristics, suggesting that each feature is uniquely attributable to virtue words
and vice words. As his argument develops, however, Professor Westen
suggests that the combination of open texture and nonlexical normativity
is actually the key to this linguistic category. 34 Surely he intends the
latter, because any attempt to limit open texture to the category of virtue
and vice words is impossible (as he himself seems to acknowledge in an
early footnote 35 ). I do not think he means to say that terms such as
"federal," 'justice," and "duress"-terms he places outside the virtue
and vice category-have a "closed," determinate character. The meanings of these terms are neither descriptively fixed nor are their prescriptive backgrounds limited to consistent norms or values. Open texture in
and of itself is therefore not important to Professor Westen; its importance arises only when it is considered in combination with the second
rather than "liberated" in this example either reflects an unconscious decision to use one syllable
rather than four, or that the term "liberated" has an added connotation of physical activity (whether
human or not) that is not present in "free" or "freed." Note, for example, that those most human of
actions-speech and religious worship-are referred to in the Constitution as "freedoms," not "lib-

erties." See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. Westen, supra note 4, at 542-44.
34. Id. at 589.
35. Id. at 543 n.4 ("open texture" refers "to an irreducible feature of all empirical descriptions") (citing Waismann, Verifiability, 19 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 119, 123 (Supp. Vol. 1945)).
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feature, nonlexical normativity. The significance of Professor Westen's
linguistic analysis will consequently depend on the nature of that combination and the substance conveyed by the concept of nonlexical
normativity.
An examination of nonlexical normativity, however, reveals that it,
too, fails to provide meaningful guidance concerning the content of the
"virtue-vice" category. One initial difficulty is that Westen's description
of this essential feature seems to vary within the article, thereby suggesting different possible classification schemes. Initially he describes
nonlexical normativity as normative ambiguity 36-that is, virtue words
and vice words have some independent content that connotes more than
the simple normative judgments of "good" or "bad." Consequently,
these terms will merely have normative tendencies rather than predetermined normative content. In the conclusion to the article, however, Professor Westen describes nonlexical normativity more broadly as "the
feature of having descriptive as well as prescriptive meanings. ' 37 These
two notions of nonlexical normativity each imply a distinct categorization scheme, and each is defective for different reasons.
Assume first that the key feature Professor Westen has in mind for
virtue words and vice words is normative ambiguity. This characterization implies that terms will apparently fall into one of three broad categories: at one extreme, the normatively neutral (such as "federal"); at the
other extreme, the inevitably normative (such as "justice" and "duress");
and in the middle, the ambiguously normative (virtue words and vice
words). Assuming this typology is accurate, I fail to see its significance.
Professor Westen asserts at the beginning of his article that the normative ambiguity of virtue words and vice words contributes to their "great
rhetorical force" 38 because this ambiguity puts one's opponent on the
defensive without simply begging the normative question involved.3 9 Yet
if I correctly understand "rhetorical" to mean "persuasive," 40 the normative ambiguity of one's message would seem to reduce, rather than
enhance, its force. 4 1 Moreover, Professor Westen asserts in the conclu36. Id. at 545.
37. Id. at 590.
38. Id at 546.

39. Id. Professor Westen does not substantiate this claim. Moreover, in controversies about
the meaning of freedom in phrases such as "the free exercise of religion," use of the term does tend to
beg the normative question involved. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 780-81.
40. Professor Westen seems to equate rhetorical force with persuasiveness. See Westen, supra
note 4, at 593.
41. An excellent discussion of the relationship between rhetoric and persuasion appears in McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 481, 482-84 (1983).
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sion to the article that rhetorical power is based not on the ability of
these terms to contribute to the argument at hand, but on their ability to
bypass it.42 Again, I do not see how this makes such words "persuasive."
To whom? Some important psychological or epistemological principle
remains unidentified here.
Perhaps I do not sufficiently understand what Westen means by
"rhetorical" force. Perhaps his point is not that these virtue words and
vice words are unusually persuasive, but instead that these terms appear
with unusualfrequency in rhetorical exchanges because of their open texture and underlying ambiguous normative content. But if this is what he
means, I do not think that he has actually proven this point or shown
that it would have any particular linguistic significance.
Now assume instead that nonlexical normativity does not mean normative ambiguity, but refers to the interplay of the descriptive and normative elements that generate the meanings of virtue words and vice
words. Under this'version, three categories of terms can also be inferred,
but these categories are quite different: at one extreme, words with only
descriptive content ("federal"); at the other extreme, words with only
normative content ("justice" and "duress"); and in the middle, words
with both descriptive and normative content (virtue and vice words). I
disagree. These categories may, at most, be sections along a continuum- different in degree only, not in kind-because all terms that have
deany significance in legal or philosophical discussion will have both
43
scriptive and normative elements jointly generating their substance. Of
course, one element may be more important than the other in particular
instances, but both elements will nevertheless be necessary to some degree. The only exception to this proposition would be uses of language
that are of no interest to this discussion. The terms Professor Westen
uses as examples demonstrate this proposition.
In what sense, for example, is the term "federal" solely descriptive?
The only circumstance in which I can envision this occurring is when the
term is examined without reference to any context whatsoever-where
no legal or political issue of any sort is involved or at stake, where the use
of the term "federal" is effectively equivalent to the use of the term
"blue." Thus, the term is not inherently solely descriptive; rather, it becomes so only because normative issues are contextually irrelevant. To
understand its "meaning," no reference to underlying norms or values
(ultimately, to senses of "goodness" or "badness") is necessary. But this
situation can have no relationship to the "meaning" of "federal" in its
42. Westen, supra note 4, at 593.

43. See Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," supra note 8, at 865-78.
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usual legal contexts. There, the substance of the term will inevitably involve some measure of normative reference. In any actual controversy
concerning our federal system of government, some "theory" of federalism-some examination of the value-laden merits and demerits of this
governmental structure-will inescapably be invoked by both sides to the
controversy, as well as the decisionmaker, to complete the analytic process. 44 Only then could we determine, for example, whether a system of
conditional grants from a central authority to local political units is consistent with (i.e., would be a legitimate exercise of power in) a federal
45
form of government.
This inevitable normativity of all terms also has implications for the
notion of "rhetorical force," so important to Westen's linguistic analysis.
Because the notion of "rhetorical force" can be significant only in the
context of a controversy, a term like "federal," which will be infused
with normative content in such a context, has rhetorical force even
though it is outside the virtue-vice category. Professor Westen claims,
however, that virtue words and vice words are distinctive because they
possess "great rhetorical force."' 46 The question, then, is whether "federal" has so much less rhetorical force than virtue words and vice words
that it is analytically meaningful to place it in a different linguistic
category.
I see no clear answer here at all. The degree to which a term is
persuasive will depend on the argument in which it is used and concerning which it can be assessed. Rhetorical power, therefore, is obviously
not only a context-specific continuum, but more importantly a function
of the complex interplay of both descriptive and normative elements.
Any distinctions between identifiable categories along this functional
continuum would inevitably be fuzzy and far more difficult to identify
than Professor Westen's analysis would suggest. Moreover, this continuum of rhetorical power may be generated by factors deeper than the
description-prescription dichotomy upon which Professor Westen relies,
a point I will develop to a limited extent later in this discussion. 47
The confusion concerning the nature of this second feature of virtue
and vice words (i.e., possession of descriptive and prescriptive elements)
also plagues Westen's other category of terms-the one into which he
places "justice" and "duress." Initially, he observes that these terms are
44. See, eg., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (discussing "Our Federalism").
45. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247-50 (1978) (discussing competing
views of the Congressional spending power).
46. Westen, supra note 4, at 546.
47. See infra Part IIB.
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inevitably normative-they always refer to "goodness" or "badness." '48
Since I have argued that all terms have a normative component, I do not
disagree with this conclusion as such. On the other hand, I do not believe a distinct category of terms can be delineated on this basis. More
importantly, however, Professor Westen later suggests that these terms
are distinct from virtue words and vice words because they are entirely
normative 4 9-they are somehow descriptively neutral or without descriptive content. Again, I must disagree. Because I posit that the substance
of all terms is at all times a function of both descriptive and normative
elements, I must reject this category of "only normative" words just as I
rejected the category of "only descriptive" words. And just as I have
argued that words can be "only descriptive" when used in circumstances
isolated from significant context, so too, words can be "only normative"
in the absence of context. For example, the words "good" and "bad"
seem to be candidates for the category of "only normative" terms since
they seem to convey a normative judgment without reference to any underlying factual detail.50 But the moment they are placed in context"good book" or "bad grades"-a descriptive element is unavoidably added to the normative inquiry.
This conclusion also holds true for Professor Westen's own examples of "justice" and "duress." The content of "justice" in a social context is a descriptive as well as a normative matter. An excellent
illustration of an effort to elucidate the "core" or central descriptive elements of the concept of justice is that of H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of
Law. 5 t Initially, Professor Hart ties the descriptive and normative elements of justice together by using a descriptive, "ordinary language" approach to narrow the normative scope of the term: "[T]he point of moral
criticism in terms of justice or injustice is usually different from, and
more specific than, the other types of general moral criticism which are
appropriate in this particular case and are expressed by words like
'wrong,' 'bad,' or 'wicked.' "52 He then identifies the central descriptive
elements of justice, including principles such as "treat like cases alike...
48. Westen, supra note 4, at 544-45.
49. Id. at 591.
50. Even this point need not be conceded, however, for terms that seem to be wholly normative
are nevertheless a part of our language, and must take on their meanings in that context. Thus, even
a term like "good" is understood to have the background descriptive content of positiveness rather
than negativeness. See generally R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 79-150 (1952). This does
not mean, of course, that language cannot be turned on its head for special effect or purpose, such as
in the colloquial use of "bad" to convey positiveness. The preexisting content of the term, however,
is the feature that permits special usage.
51.

H. HART, supra note 7, at 151-80.

52. Id. at 154.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[VCol. 1986:660

and . .. different cases differently, '53 proportionality, 54 impartiality,5 5
and objectivity. 56 Descriptive criteria are also involved when he distin-

57
guishes between "distributive" and "compensatory" senses of justice.

Another example of the importance of the descriptive meaning of justice

is Professor Guido Calabresi's effort in a recent article58 to articulate the
relationship between justice and economic efficiency. He concludes at

one point: "I have always believed that efficiency and distributional language does not translate directly into justice language; that there are

components of the just society that could only be encompassed in the
terms efficiency and distribution if these terms were given a meaning far
'5 9
different from their ordinary ones."

These uses of the term "justice" illustrate that descriptive detail is
necessary for all terms, not simply to develop the "full" meaning of the
term in the manner expected of scholars, but also to develop any meaning, even for the purpose of obfuscation or some other rhetorical goal.
The reason is, quite simply, that the absence of any definitional structure
would make the use of "normative" terms completely incommensurable
from one speaker (with his or her particular normative agenda) to the
next. 60 The key element that leads speakers and their audiences to believe that a debate on an issue has actually been joined is this underlying

descriptive essence that permits some (although perhaps quite limited,

61
imperfect, and manipulable) linguistic comparability.
I conclude, then, that Professor Westen's category of virtue words
and vice words, to the extent it exists at all, at most contains terms that
have a peculiarly heavy normative component. This component may
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 156.
Id.

57. Id. at 154-55, 159-61.
58. Calabresi, About Law and Economics: 4 Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.

553 (1980).
59. Id. at 559. Calabresi's sense of "distribution" is of course very different from Hart's use of
the term as a definitional component of justice.
60. I am not certain that I undertsand Professor Westen's message about these "normative"
terms. With reference to his separation of description and prescription, he may be arguing that
certain words that have both these elements (i.e., virtue words and vice words) have two separate
and independent meanings, both somehow legitimate. Or he could be contending that description
and prescription are independent elements that comprise a single legitimate "range" of meaning for
these words. I believe only the latter position is viable. For a term to be used in discourse at allfor it to have any rhetorical value-that term cannot be used by two speakers who give it entirely
separate meanings. For debate to occur, some modicum of common ground will be necessary. Thus,
the two speakers might emphasize separate elements or sources of meaning, but at some fundamental
level they have to be considered to be talking about the same subject. Entirely independent meanings
would not seem capable of producing this result.
61. See supra note 20 (discussing the linguistic theory of "focal meaning").
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regularly overwhelm the descriptive elements of the term in particular
controversies or relegate those elements to a secondary status. Nevertheless, the distinction between this category and the categories into which
he places "federal," "justice," and "duress" is extremely fuzzy and
troublesome. If "rhetorical force" is defined, as Professor Westen suggests at the end of his article, as the capacity not to facilitate argument
but to bypass it,62 then any term from any of these categories would
potentially possess this characteristic simply by a speaker's selective emphasis of either the term's descriptive or normative elements, whichever
will insulate it from the relevant detail of the argument at hand.
B.

The Distinction Between Virtue Words and Vice Words.

The strongest and most interesting part of Professor Westen's article
His conis his analysis of the concepts of "freedom" 63 and "coercion."
sistent reference to the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive
uses of these terms6 5 yields much of value; it helps structure our understanding of the ways in which these terms are used. Unfortunately, some
of his conclusions concerning these terms are questionable simply because he links them to his troublesome general linguistic category of virtue and vice words. For instance, the terms "freedom" and "coercion"
are for him representative examples drawn from the two halves of the
virtue-vice category, and they are intended to illustrate the distinction
between a "virtue" word, on the one hand, and a "vice" word, on the
other. I find this division within the category almost as troubling as the
category itself.
The distinction is apparently based entirely on the normative element inherent in each term, one positive and the other negative. Thus,
'66
virtue words, as Professor Westen puts it, convey both "is and ought,"
while vice words convey "is and ought not."' 67 Yet this simple separation
can be understood in two very different ways depending upon the nature
of the virtue-vice category itself. First, Professor Westen could be understood as saying that all terms having both descriptive and prescriptive
components will be either virtue words or vice words. Thus, the two
sets-descriptive-prescriptive words and virtue-vice words-would be
coextensive. Or, second, he could mean more simply that some words in
the descriptive-prescriptive set have particularly "heavy" normative
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Westen, supra note 4, at 593.
Id. at 549-58.
Id. at 558-89.
See id. at 554-58, 575-89.
Id. at 555, 558, 591.
Id. at 591.
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components and consequently may be grouped naturally at the extremes
of this category. Under this view, terms that qualify for the special "virtue" and "vice" labels would not be a distinct category, but rather subsets within the larger descriptive-prescriptive set.
I think either of these formulations is incorrect. If he means that
the virtue-vice category and the descriptive-prescriptive set are coextensive, then into which camp, taking but one among countless examples,
does the term "property" fall? Certainly that word has both descriptive
and normative elements; 68 consequently it must also be a virtue or a vice
word. But which is it? For many people it will no doubt be a virtue
word, but not for everyone, even within the single social context of the
United States. 69 Thus, the labels "virtue" and "vice" cannot comfortably
and meaningfully exhaust the obviously larger descriptive-prescriptive
category.
If, on the other hand, Professor Westen agrees with this conclusion
and only means that virtue words and vice words occupy the extremes of
the larger descriptive-prescriptive category, then the significance of his
analysis is seriously diminished. With reference to his guiding principles
of description and prescription, I would state the point more simply:
although all terms are comprised of both these elements, virtue words
and vice words have the special characteristic of an unusually heavy emphasis on the normative aspect that generates their substance. In effect,
we recognize in advance that the normative element in such terms is the
dominant variable in a "meaning" function, and the descriptive element
is subordinated.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this conclusion, I have nagging
doubts about its accuracy if it is conjoined with Professor Westen's observation that the predominate normative component in virtue words
and vice words is also tinged in advance with inherent positive or negative connotations. Rather than challenge this idea directly, however, I
would suggest a supplemental linguistic hypothesis that Professor Westen himself notes,70 but does not develop. Perhaps the rhetorical
power-or more accurately, the frequency of use in rhetorical exchange-of the words he has identified derives not simply from their preexisting, insufficiently anchored normativity, but moreover from their
ability to slide back and forth between positive and negative normativity
between moral approbation and moral condemnation, based on the
speaker and the context. A good example is Professor Westen's vice
68.
69.
itself an
70.

See Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," supra note 8, at 865-79.
The distinction between individual opinions and "social" or group-referenced opinions is
important problem. See infra Part IIB.
See Westen, supra note 4, at 593.
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word "coercion," which he nevertheless recognizes to be potentially positive. 7 1 For example, coercion may be beneficial in situations involving
72
parental supervision of children and self-defense against an attacker.
Thus, an important additional difficulty in Professor Westen's attempt to
distinguish between virtue and vice words, assuming they exist at all, is
that this division within his category is not permanent or stable. Instead,
the subcategories of virtue words and vice words simply contain terms
that "usually" merit either the virtue or vice label.
This linguistic indeterminacy, however, does not in itself demonstrate that the virtue and vice labels are necessarily indefensible. Rather,
the ambiguity of these sets makes any attempt to link them to particular
concepts such as "freedom" and "coercion" more problematic.
II.

THE INADEQUACIES OF THE DESCRIPTION-PRESCRIPTION
DICHOTOMY

One of my criticisms of Professor Westen's virtue-vice category has
been my rejection of the idea that the content of terms can be entirely
descriptive or entirely normative. Instead, I have argued that these elements conjoin in one degree or another in all terms to generate meaning.
Yet at the same time Ibelieve that some of the most important points
Professor Westen makes in Virtue Words and Vice Words have to do
with the different senses of "freedom" or "coercion" or "threat" that can
be and are generated by the respective descriptive and normative uses of
such terms. My ability to hold these two attitudes simultaneously and
consistently requires some explication, but my efforts to resolve this difficulty have led me to some basic insights concerning the distinctions between and deficiencies of our respective approaches to language.
A.

Definition, Explanation, and Justification: On the Distinction
Between Microfacts and Macrofacts.

Both Professor Westen and I have argued that the analysis involved
in legal and moral linguistics is essentially dichotomous or bipolar in
character-that is, the meaning of terms can be isolated by examining
two basic elements. He has labeled those elements description and prescription, while I have labeled them definition and theory, or sometimes
description and justification-labels that roughly correspond to a conventional "fact-value" dichotomy. Our analytical categories are differ71. Id. at 592 ("[W]e carelessly assume that all coercion is presumptively bad." (footnote
omitted)).
72. Id. at 592 n.146 ("[C]oercion is not always wrong (quite obviously: one coerces the small
child not to run across the highway, or the murderer to drop his weapon) ...." (quoting Held,
Coercionand Coercive Offers, in NoMOs XIV: COERCION 2 (1.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1972))).
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ent, however, in more ways than their labels. Indeed, the important
substantive distinctions between them demonstrate that each of us has
glossed over an important element of meaning.
The necessity of this additional element, which I will explore only
briefly in this section, stems from the recognition that a simple "factvalue" dichotomy fails to account for two distinct sorts of "facts," each
generating our descriptive understanding of the world (and particularly
here, the linguistic world). For convenience, I will call these two kinds
of facts "microfacts" and "macrofacts." Microfacts are individual bits of
descriptive data; in linguistics, these are single, discrete circumstances in
which a term is used by an individual. Macrofacts, however, are not just
aggregate collections of descriptive data, but collections that are structured or organized according to some descriptive theme or principle. In
linguistics, the macrofact of conventional usage of a term in society will
be the background against which an individual's use of a term can be
compared. The descriptive content of a term based on microfacts may be
different from that of the same term based on macrofacts, and this distinction necessarily affects the linguistic schemes that both Professor
Westen and I have employed.
The distinction between microfacts and macrofacts is already reflected in my analytical scheme, but the unique roles of these elements
have not yet been sufficiently articulated. My dichotomy of definition
and theory, for example, does not in itself embody this distinction. On
the one hand, a definitional analysis of a concept is in part microfactual
because it is a report of the actual incidents of use of a term, incidents
that can then be aggregated to form a set. This report becomes
macrofactual only when the set is structured or organized by identifying
the standard, recurring elements or characteristics that constitute the
concept-in other words, the bits of information that are conveyed when
the term is used. "Ownership" is a good example. The set of microfactual instances of use of that term discloses certain macrofactual features
73
such as the "right to sell," the "right to exclude," and so on.
By the same token, macrofacts also play a role in my "theory" category. A theoretical exercise is distinct from a definitional one, in my
jargon, because a theory emphasizes some deeper foundation for the definitional substance of a concept. But that foundation can be of two different types: justificatory (normative, value-based) or explanatory
(macrofactual). A justificatory theory focuses primarily on the moral legitimacy of a concept, and then secondarily and subordinately on the
73. See Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 112-28 (A. Guest ed.
1961) (discussing the "standard incidents" of ownership).
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facts of its actual use in legal and moral discourse. These facts are understood and assessed by reference to some normative theme-for example,
ownership could be understood to embody a Hegelian personality theory
of property. 74 An explanatory theory, on the other hand, explains how a
concept came to acquire its current characteristics. That is, the definition of a term, based on microfactual data and macrofactual general
characteristics, is understood more fundamentally by reference to a descriptive, macrofactual theme, rather than by reference to a normative
one. For example, ownership could be interpreted as embodying eco75
nomic efficiency.
Nevertheless, the "full" meaning or substance of a concept is a function of both definition and theory, and of both microfacts and
macrofacts. These categories combine to create in essence three exercises
at the foundation of linguistic analysis: definition (microfacts and
macrofacts), explanation (macrofacts), and justification (normative
values).
The microfact-macrofact distinction is also not sufficiently recognized in Professor Westen's description-prescription dichotomy.
Although he emphasizes a clean break between description and prescription, his descriptive technique places too much emphasis on microfacts,
and virtually ignores macrofacts. His sense of a linguistic "fact" is captured entirely, as I read his article, by the manner in which a term is used
by an individual speaker. Thus, the concept of "threat," as Professor
Westen analyzes it, has two levels or "baselines" 7 6 from which its meaning is derived: one is descriptive and anchored in the perception of the
individual victim; another is prescriptive, and based upon a
nonindividual (societal? biblical?) perspective establishing a set of accepted values from which the interaction between the victim and the individual making the threat is normatively assessed. 77 Professor Westen's
approach does not include, however, a macrodescriptive perspective that
attempts to put the victim's microdescriptive perceptions in a larger factual context. An example of reasoning from this macrodescriptive perspective would be the following: "From observing a large number of
cases we have determined that people feel that if X occurs, their incomes
will drop, and that they therefore refer to X as a threat to their welfare.
In fact, however, careful economic analysis demonstrates that the occur74. See Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," supra note 8, at 874; Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 971-78 (1982).
75. See Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," supra note 8, at 875 & n.57.
76. Westen defines "baseline" as "a stipulated starting point... from which to measure...
changes in [an individual's] condition." Westen, supra note 4, at 572. These baselines serve the

purpose of "distinguishing threats from offers for purposes of coercion." Id. at 575.
77. Id. at 575-87.
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rence of X will not produce a decrease in income in the vast majority of
cases. Thus, while people generally perceive X as a threat, in fact it is
not."
The macrofact category is of critical importance because language is
itself a macrofact, rather than a microfact. The "legitimacy" of a term's
use is measured in societal, not individual, terms because communication-the foundational principle of language-is an interactional phenomenon. Thus, in the final analysis "we" must determine whether a
term like "threat" has been used "properly" in a given instance, and that
perception of propriety will not be based solely on normative values.
Rather, some reference to the larger factual (historical, cultural) context
in which the term is used will be involved.
Microfacts therefore play an important role in linking, as well as
distinguishing, descriptive and prescriptive linguistic elements. A good
illustration is again Professor Westen's examination of the term "threat."
He concludes that the term has two different meanings, one purely descriptive (from the point of view of the agent) and the other purely normative (an aggregated normative assessment). 78 Although his insight
into levels of meaning here is an important one, I do not believe he portrays the situation accurately. The two levels of meaning Professor Westen attributes to threat can only be "purely descriptive" or "purely
normative" with very odd, and I think inaccurate, understandings of
these supposed categories. His "purely descriptive" category achieves
this status solely because he limits it to one individual-the victim-and
assumes that the "fact" of this person's attitude must be a normatively
neutral event. Although I agree that our perception of this attitude can
be reduced to a mere anecdotal fact like an entry in an opinion poll, the
process by which that victim arrived at his perception of loss could well
have involved (indeed, I would argue must have involved) some assessment of the normative "goodness" and "badness" of the range of options
within his circumstances. This individual's conclusion-"I feel
threatened"-may have involved a purely selfish sense of individual aggrandizement that rejects current moral attitudes about respect for
others. But in all likelihood, the victim's mental exercise was not so myopic. The victim's very use of the term "threat" calls into play its meaning as part of society's language (a macrofact), not his own private
language (a nonexistent microfact). Society's words then unavoidably
carry with them a complex of generative normative baggage as well.
Hence, a normative component to the term, no matter how small or inconsequential, will be involved in the victim's use of the term. The use of
78. Id.
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the term may "primarily" convey normatively neutral, descriptive
"facts" as Professor Westen understands and uses that idea, but it could
not have been completely devoid of normative substance.
The same is true about the supposed "prescriptive only" level of
meaning to which Professor Westen refers. Again, meaningful, contextual communication is impossible unless the language used possesses
some underlying definitional (descriptive) content, both microfactual and
macrofactual, even if this descriptive content is heavily and purposefully
value-laden. This is precisely the conclusion Professor Westen has apparently reached with regard to the concept of "equality." Having earlier insisted that the substance of equality was entirely normative, 79 he
now acknowledges that a key communicative role is played by the underlying macrofactual definitional structure of the concept. 80 The necessity
for some descriptive content also applies to the term "threat," even when
used in the normative mode characterized by Professor Westen. That is,
for any normative substance to be attached to a term, some minimal,
agreed-upon definitional (macrodescriptive) framework for the term
must be present. This is not to say that the descriptive aspect of the term
will be its dominant feature; quite the contrary, the normative sense of
the term may be the dominant, controlling variable in the complex function that generates meaning.
B.

Objectivity, Subjectivity, and RhetoricalForce.

The complication introduced by the idea of a macrofact can be
stated in an alternative, more abstract form that suggests an explanation
for the problematic notion that some words have relatively greater rhetorical force than others. In a recent article8 1 Stephen Massey examined
the consequences of the fact-value dichotomy as it relates to the troublesome philosophical concept of "self-respect." In doing so, he challenged
from a new perspective the adequacy of the descriptive-prescriptive dichotomy at the heart of Professor Westen's analytic technique.
Professor Massey observed that "self-respect" could be understood
in either of two ways: as a descriptive, individual fact or as a normative
moral value.8 2 If it is the former, then it is entirely subjective and cannot
generate sweeping moral conclusions. 83 If it is the latter, then an "objec79.
80.
concept
81.
82.
83.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Westen, supra note 4, at 543-44 (identifying the core definitional element of equality as "the
that likes should be treated alike").
Massey, Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?, 93 ETHICS 246 (1983).
Id. at 248-55.
Id. at 258 ("The subjective concept of self-respect is independent of all moral notions
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tive" assessment of self-respect might be possible by referring to an
84
agreed-upon standard that prescribes a "right kind" of self-respect.
But this standard necessarily presupposes and fixes the normative sub-

stance of self-respect, making the use of the term self-respect a conclusion rather than a part of a philosophical analysis. Consequently, the

focus in any such analysis must be the normative principles underlying
and constituting the concept of self-respect, not the fact of self-respect
5
itself.8
Professor Massey's observations may seem to track Professor Westen's examination of "freedom," "coercion," "threat," and so on, but

Professor Massey introduces critical additional elements and perspectives. Professor Massey's analysis indicates that the distinctions among
various meanings of a term cannot be understood simply by segregating
their descriptive and prescriptive content. Instead, the subjectivity of the

descriptive exercise must be distinguished from the comparative objectivity of the prescriptive exercise. This is a difficult proposition to grasp
because we usually ascribe objectivity to the descriptive, "fact" category

of analysis, and subjectivity to the prescriptive, "value" category. Professor Massey correctly notes, however, that from the point of view of the

audience assessing the use of a particular concept in discourse, the objective-subjective labels are paradoxically reversed. The idea of an "audience" reverses the usual objective-subjective labels because it embodies

the notion of a macrofact. Hence, Professor Massey notes the subjectivity of individual, psychological, "descriptive" references to self-respectthe microfacts of my earlier discussion-and the comparative objectivity
of the conventional (audience-based) normativity of the concept-in

84. Id. at 253 ("According to the objective account, it is necesary but not sufficient for selfrespect that a person believe he acts in ways that are worthy. In addition, the person must have the
correct views about his worth, and act in ways that are objectively worthy.").
The subjective/objective dichotomy has been the object of a staggering amount of literature,
much of it continental, some of it at the heart of the Critical Legal Studies movement, and nearly all
of it outside the scope of these brief comments. See, eg., R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM
AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAxiS (1983); Unger, The CriticalLegal Stud.
iesMovement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 567-76 (1983).
85. In other words, the psychological, "descriptive" references to self-respect refer only to the
psychological fact of self-respect that relies on individual, subjective valuations. The normative endorsement or condemnation of a particular person's self-respect involves something more. Such
judgment carries with it a tacit endorsement or condemnation of that person's conception of "right"
behavior as well-whether that person has the "right kind" of self-respect. In such cases, reference
must be made to some antecedent standard; a person's self-respect cannot be viewed as morally
appropriate simply because that person so views it. The standard to be applied is "objective" in the
sense that it involves not individual valuations, but some larger, socially-endorsed patterns of attitude and behavior.
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other words, a form of macrofact. 8 6
We therefore have a new tension about which we must be sensitive
in the context of communication. On the one hand, we have microfactual uses of a term where the descriptive content is subjectively supplied.
On the other hand, we have macrofactual, value-laden uses of the same
term where the descriptive content is objectively supplied and derived
from values that can be identified but cannot be "proved," and hence
87
remain controversial.
This complex phenomenon may in turn help to explain why Professor Westen's attachment of "great rhetorical force" to his virtue and vice
words remains so troublesome. Perhaps some sense of "rhetorical usefulness" (rather than "force") could be based on the subtle separation of
descriptively subjective and prescriptively objective content of a term.
The descriptively subjective content of a term makes the term an individual "fact," but insulates and constrains analysis due to the inherent difficulty of interpersonal comparisons among different aggregations of fact.
The prescriptively objective content of a term makes the term a social
"value," the conventional normative substance of which might be "discovered" with diligent study, but which would remain inescapably controversial. Thus, ambiguity and flexibility, both descriptively and
normatively, are deeply embedded linguistic characteristics that allow
many terms, not just virtue words and vice words, to "speak around" the
substance of the controversy to which they are seemingly addressed.
III.

CONCLUSION

Much work must yet be done to develop adequately the relationships among language, reasoning, and rhetoric. Professor Westen has
contributed significantly to our understanding of the nature and importance of conceptual categories in legal and moral contexts, and he will no
doubt continue to do so. I have sought here, however, to identify certain
major tensions and difficulties that I believe burden his analytic technique. I am troubled by the separation he emphasizes between descriptive and prescriptive meanings of terms, and by the virtue-vice category
of terms that is, in part, a function of that separation. In contrast, I have
emphasized a more complex fact-value dichotomy at the foundation of
linguistic substance. I do not pretend, however, that in these few pages I
have established a complete foundation for the distinction between
86. Compare Massey, supra note 81, at 249 (listing the criteria of self-respect from a subjective
point of view) with id. at 254-55 (noting that an objective account of self-respect must make reference to moral values).
87. Id. at 255-61.
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microfacts and macrofacts, or that I have discussed the full range of their
implications.
Despite our analytic differences, Professor Westen and I share a fundamental concern with the nature and structure of legal questions and
argumentation. We both believe that communication and legitimacy are
inextricably bound, making attention to language unavoidable for legal
and moral theory. These comments on and criticisms of Professor Westen's article are therefore intended both to underscore the importance of
conceptual analysis and to add to the debate about it.

